Boots on the Ground: A War Trump Cannot Win From the Air Alone
- Brice Tseen Fu Lee & Juan Pablo Sims
- Apr 1
- 5 min read
Donald Trump says the United States can get what it wants in Iran without sending in ground troops. Marco Rubio said on March 27 that Washington can achieve its objectives without a ground invasion and that the war could end in “weeks, not months”. He also described those objectives in broad terms: dismantling Iran’s missile and drone capabilities and degrading its navy and air force. Those are not limited aims as they are trying to break Iran’s main tools of deterrence and coercion.
The problem is that the war has not produced the leverage needed to force that kind of outcome. Current assessments indicate that only about one-third of Iran’s missile arsenal has been confirmed destroyed. Another third is believed to be damaged or buried in underground sites, while the rest may still be usable. Iran is also assessed to retain roughly 30 percent of its launch capacity. That is enough to keep striking, keep resisting, and keep rejecting terms it sees as unacceptable.
Trump’s current position looks weaker than it did before the war. Before the strikes, Iran was at least willing to negotiate. Indirect U.S.-Iran talks were taking place in Oman, Geneva, and Switzerland, and by mid-February both sides had reportedly reached an understanding on the main guiding principles of a possible deal. Even the last prewar round ended not with a breakdown, but with plans to resume talks and hold technical discussions in Vienna. That did not mean an agreement was close. It meant that diplomacy was still alive.
Now compare that earlier position to Iran’s position during the war. The U.S. 15-point ludicrous proposal reportedly includes dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, curbing its missile program, and relinquishing leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have described the proposal as one-sided and unfair, and said it asks Iran to give up defensive capabilities for vague promises in return. In other words, Washington is now asking for more at the very moment when trust is lower and the war has made Iranian leaders more suspicious, not less.
This is where Trump’s terms run into a basic political problem. Why would Iran dismantle its nuclear program now when that issue was already on the table before and talks did not prevent attack? If Tehran concludes that negotiation can happen right up until the point bombs start falling, then dismantling the program under pressure does not look like peace. It looks like weakening itself for no reliable gain. That is especially true now that Iranian leaders are openly saying trust is necessary for talks and that trust is missing thanks to Trump sudden attack.
The same problem applies to negotiations themselves. If Iran was already talking and still got attacked, why would it believe the same pattern will not repeat? A future agreement, from Tehran’s point of view, may simply become the opening move in another round of coercion. That is why the trust issue is not a side point. It goes to the heart of whether any American proposal is credible. This is also reflected in Maduro’s kidnapping in Venezuela. Trump has not just made demands. He has made those demands after showing that talks do not necessarily shield Iran from force.
The missile issue is no less difficult. Why would Iran reduce one of the few tools it still has to impose costs while it is still under attack? Missiles are not just weapons in this war. They are bargaining power. As long as Iran can still retaliate, it can still refuse. Asking Tehran to reduce that capability while it remains under pressure is effectively asking it to disarm in the middle of a fight. No government is likely to do that voluntarily unless it has already lost badly enough that it sees no alternative. What evidence would there be that the U.S. would not attack once dismantled? The available battlefield evidence does not suggest Iran is at that point.
The Hormuz demand is even harder to take seriously. The Strait of Hormuz carries around 20 percent of global oil and gas supplies, and several Gulf states are now explicitly telling Washington that any outcome must prevent Iran from using that route as leverage again. But that very fact shows why Tehran is unlikely to give it up willingly. Hormuz is one of the few ways Iran can raise the cost of war for everyone else. It is one of its strongest remaining cards. States do not surrender their main bargaining chip unless they are forced into a much worse position than Iran is in now.
That leaves Trump with only two real choices. The first is to take a ceasefire or weaker deal and end the war from a worse position than the one he had before the attack. Before February 28, there was at least some diplomatic space and at least some possibility of a deal. Now, after the strikes, Tehran is more defiant, the proposal on the table is broader and harsher, and U.S. leverage still appears incomplete. To stop now without major concessions would look like escalation that failed to improve the deal. Reports already describe Trump as caught between negotiating a quick exit and escalating further, while his approval numbers have fallen and the war remains unpopular at home.
The second option is to escalate until Iran has no meaningful choice left. That is where boots on the ground comes in. Airpower can hit targets, damage infrastructure, and kill personnel. It does not by itself secure underground facilities, seize stockpiles, verify dismantlement, or physically deny recovery. If Washington wants terms that require Iran to give up hardened assets and critical capabilities, then at some point it may need physical control, not just bombardment. That does not necessarily mean a full-scale invasion. It could mean a raid, a seizure of a site, or a limited operation to secure a strategic asset. But once U.S. troops are on the ground, even in a supposedly narrow role, the war moves into a more dangerous phase.
This is why the issue is no longer very simple. Trump wanted a better deal than the one available before the war. Instead, he may have made the bargaining environment worse. Iran was previously open to talks. Now it is fighting while still holding enough leverage to refuse the current terms. Trump is left with a choice between accepting a weaker outcome than the one he might have gotten before the attack, or escalating further in the hope of recovering leverage through force. Given his political style, the first option is hard for him to swallow. That is what makes the second option more plausible.
Boots on the ground is not necessary because it is wise. It becomes necessary only if Trump insists on demands that Iran will not accept voluntarily and that airpower alone may not be able to enforce. That is the trap he has created for himself. He wants the terms of victory without yet having achieved the kind of battlefield position that usually produces them. If he refuses to lower those demands, then pressure for some form of ground operation will keep growing.
This article co-written by Dr. Brice Tseen Fu Lee and Dr. Juan Pablo Sims.
Dr. Brice Tseen Fu Lee is a Bruneian Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of International and Strategic Studies at Universiti Malaya. His work has appeared in The Diplomat, the South China Morning Post, and Fulcrum, as well as in peer-reviewed journals such as World Affairs, Chinese Political Science Review, Latin American Policy and others.
Dr. Juan Pablo Sims is a Chilean scholar in the Faculty of Government at Universidad del Desarrollo and a researcher at the Center for International Relations Studies. His work has been published in The Diplomat and in peer-reviewed journals such as World Affairs, Chinese Political Science Review, Latin American Policy and others.
Comments