Indonesia’s Arms Diversification is inevitable, but the Approach Must Prudent
- Sandy J. Pratama
- Jan 2
- 4 min read
Indonesia arms modernization has proven to be one of president’s primary priority programs. The president’s Asta Cita program has called for strengthening the national defense system and empowering the country’s autonomy as one concerted effort. Arms modernization program fall under Optimum Essential Forces (OEF), the continuation of previous long-term military modernization called Minimum Essential Programs (MEF).
On the larger framework, OEF is meant to be achieved via the Archipelagic Trident Shield or Perisai Trisula Nusantara (PTN) master plan, which Prabowo conceived when he was still the defense minister (2019-2024). The end goals is an integrated battle force with multi-domain and joint operations capability centered on islands defense. OEF takes on network centric operations as its key theme, addressing something that TNI currently lacked off even at interoperability level. It caused by operating various types of weapons from multitude of suppliers, side effect of diversification approach.
In addition, it potentially exacerbated by interim readiness policy pursued by government. The interim readiness policy aimed to acquire weapons through Fast Tracked Acquisition (FTA) program by procuring second-hand or poaching other customer orders. It meant to close the gap left unfulfilled by the MEF in short term, while waiting the delivery the already ordered weapons.
Another aspect of this policy is the sense of urgency that rooted on anxiety of geological and security landscape in the region, further justifying fast-tracked deliberations. It however results on something that not necessarily useful or asked by the end user, let alone the interoperability with existing system and doctrine compatibility. Maintenance cost for second-hand weapons also significantly higher and more prone for breakdown or accident. This is because often the prestige's value and fear of missing out outweighs the consideration and decision.
Nevertheless, arms diversification is inevitable for Indonesia. It attempts to reduce dependency by diversifying the arms supplier and it’s not without the rationale. Since 1965 Indonesia has faced three arms embargoes, each one incapacitated its armed forces. With current geopolitical divide, arms embargo or limitation becomes yet another imminent threat. Diversification is taken, not only to prevent or even mitigate the impact from such situations but also to maintain the Indonesian strategic autonomy. Ideally, it should empower the local defense industry to substitute dependency in the long-term. Foreign supplies have been used as a catalyst to stimulate growth in local industries through offsets. In reality, rudimentary capabilities and capacity of local industries hinder such strategy.
Another reason for diversification is that solely depends to certain suppliers, which considered a rule of thumb for interoperability, would cast burden within Indonesia tight fiscal budget as they’re generally more expensive. Despite the outlook for military expenditure in 2025 reach 1% of GDP, it expected mostly will go for personnel and staff as TNI on the organizational expansion. Data from IISS Military Balance+ shows that on average only 17% went for defense investment in the past 15 years. Indonesia is in turn became increasingly more dependent on foreign loans to fund the arms modernization, which are more expensive due to interest must be paid on loans. Advanced weapon also tends to be granted only to alliance members given to its sensitivity. Indonesia free and active foreign policy prohibit such alliance membership and thus certain advanced weapons must be sourced from the others.
As evidently seen in the Ukrainian forces and both sides during Indo – Pakistani standoff last May, mixed weapons and diversification not only can be integrated but it can also tip the balance. While this is possible for Indonesia, there are caveats. First, it must assess carefully potential partners. Mapping the partners is important because diversification means that Indonesia must deal with multiple actors in the long term. Potential partners mapping will give the decision makers a foresight on partners characteristics, political alignment and complexity, defense capability and capacity, their past commitment with Indonesia and other customer, which eventually forming the understanding on the associated risk and the necessary mitigation.
Second, since Indonesia does not have fiscal luxury, weapons should be chosen according to its priority level based on user requirements and its scenario of use. For instance, aircraft carrier is a nice things to have and surely will enhance the HA/DR operation or to gain the experience of drone carrier operation. However, it is not a must have capability given to budgetary constraint, overlapping roles with the LPD fleets, and islands-chain that serves as forward base for maritime drone operation. Other priority such as submarine, large surface ship, patrol ship, autonomous vessel and more importantly repair and maintenance are more meaningful than a single aircraft carrier. Lastly, arms acquisition must account its life cycle cost. It’s the cost associated with an asset throughout its entire lifespan, from procurement, operational, crew, infrastructure, maintenance, until its disposal. Calculating the cost accurately is difficult, but not estimating such cost would mislead the decisions. Conventional wisdom holds that higher weapons interoperability reduces life cycle costs.
As world order continue to crumble and geopolitical competition heats up, Prabowo’s mission to modernize Indonesian armed forces is a long overdue. But it must stay prudent so that it can be financially sustainable and combat-ready. The politics of arms diversification, that is transparent, reasonable, and accountable, needs to be institutionalized within Indonesia defense framework since it’s an inevitable reality. In the end, Indonesia is big nation that deserve a proper, capable, and professional armed forces.
This article written by Sandy J. Pratama, Research Fellows at Binus Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS), a research center of International Relations Department, Bina Nusantara (BINUS) University. His research interests include Indonesia defense policy and management, Asia-Pacific defense and security issue, and emerging technology appliance in military affairs. His writing have been published in Jakarta Post, ASPI’s The Strategist, and RSIS IDSS Paper.
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