Saudi Arabia’s Blurred Foreign Policy on Iran: Strategy or Inconsistency?
- Syaripah Shofiah Azzahra
- 4 hours ago
- 5 min read
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy toward Iran has rarely appeared as ambiguous as it does today in the recent tensions between Iran. Israel, and the USA. In 2023, Saudi Arabia has taken a bold step to restore diplomatic ties with Tehran through an agreement brokered by China, a step widely seen as a pivot toward de-escalation. Yet as recent tensions involving the United States and Israel intensify, Riyadh has sent mixed signals by publicly urging restraint while quietly aligning with efforts to contain Iran. Because many sources have stated that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself spoke with President Trump about efforts to continue pressuring Iran and referred to this as a “historic opportunity,” though Saudi officials later did not confirm this. This contradiction raises a question: is Saudi Arabia’s Iran policy genuinely inconsistent, or is this ambiguity a deliberate strategy?
At first, this stance appears contradictory. But Saudi Arabia’s shifting stance is better understood not as inconsistency, but as a calculated strategy, it reflects a deeper dilemma between short-term stability and long-term strategic advantage.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have been a long time rivals in the region. While often framed through a sectarian lens between Sunni and Shia. The competition is fundamentally geopolitical. Both states seek regional influence, leadership in the Muslim world, and control over strategic spaces stretching from the Gulf to the Levant. This rivalry has unfolded through proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, with each side backing opposing actors to expand its influence without engaging in direct war.
Within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia plays a central role in coordinating responses to Iran’s regional behavior. For Gulf states, Iran’s expanding missile arsenal, its drone warfare capabilities, and its network of non-state allies represent a persistent and evolving threat. These concerns are not merely speculation. The 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities were widely attributed to Iranian-linked actors, demonstrated the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and the potential global consequences of regional escalation.
The 2023 rapprochement was more of a readjustment than a resolution. Both Riyadh and Tehran had strong incentives to reduce tensions for the sake of their interest. For Saudi Arabia, stability is essential to the success of its Vision 2030 agenda, which its heavily depends on foreign investment, economic diversification, and a predictable regional environment. For Iran, normalization offered a way to ease diplomatic isolation and manage the pressures of sanctions.
However, the normalization did not erase the structural rivalry between the two states. Instead, this actually creates a fragile interdependence that can be easily disrupted by shifts in the broader geopolitical landscape. Recent tensions have exposed precisely this fragility. As the risk of confrontation involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has increased, Saudi Arabia has adopted a dual-track approach that appears to make it ambigous. Publicly, it has opposed escalation, wary of the economic and security consequences of another regional conflict. Privately, however, there are indications that Riyadh sees strategic value in sustained pressure on Iran.
This is where Saudi Arabia’s dilemma becomes most apparent. On one hand, a weakened Iran serves Saudi strategic interests. Riyadh arguably stands to gain from an Iran that is economically constrained, diplomatically isolated, and militarily contained. U.S.-led sanctions and economic pressure play directly into this calculation. Iran’s economy depends not only on crude oil exports but also on fuel oil, liquified petroleum gas, natural gas, and petrochemicals products that are sold to a wide range of countries across Asia and beyond.
Here, the economic dimension becomes critical. Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest exporter of refined petroleum and petrochemical products, while neighboring Gulf states including Qatar and Oman are major exporters of natural gas and related resources. In the event that Iran’s exports are curtailed by sanctions or conflict, these states are well-positioned to fill the gap in global markets. In this sense, sustained pressure on Iran does not merely weaken a rival,it creates economic opportunities for the Gulf.
Yet this comes with a significant risks. The very process of weakening Iran whether through sanctions or military escalation, undermines the stability that Saudi Arabia has worked to cultivate Vision 2030 is built on the promise of a stable, investor-friendly environment. Regional volatility, particularly involving a direct or indirect conflict with Iran, threatens to erode investor confidence and disrupt economic planning.
This tension lies at the heart of Saudi Arabia’s strategic balancing act. Riyadh wants Iran to be weaker, but not at the cost of regional chaos. It seeks to benefit from Iran’s constraints, but not from a war that could spill across borders and target critical infrastructure.
As Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group has observed, Saudi officials want the war to end but how it ends matters. By this means that Riyadh wants a clear ends. A conflict that leaves Iran or other parties with a lingering feelings of resentment even though the war has ended could translate into renewed proxy conflicts, asymmetric attacks, or cycles of retaliation that would place Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors in a state of insecurity.
In this sense, the end of conflict is not enough. What Riyadh seeks is a controlled outcome that limits Iran’s capabilities without provoking an enduring backlash. Anything less risks becoming a ticking time bomb for the region.
Saudi Arabia’s approach can therefore be understood as a form of strategic hedging. Rather than committing fully to confrontation or reconciliation, it is attempting to navigate a middle path. It maintains diplomatic channels with Iran to reduce the risk of direct conflict, while simultaneously aligning with U.S. efforts to contain Iranian power. This dual approach allows Riyadh to preserve flexibility in an uncertain environment.
Such strategies reflect broader shifts in the international system. The Middle East is no longer defined by rigid alliances. Instead, countries in the region are increasingly adopting multi-alignment foreign policies, forming partnerships with various actors, and diversifying their economies while avoiding excessive dependence on any single power. Saudi Arabia’s relations with China, its continued dependence on the United States, and its cautious efforts to build ties with Iran all point to this evolving logic.
Saudi Arabia is responding to a world in which the old rules of alignment no longer apply, and where survival depends on the ability to balance competing pressures. This does not mean the strategy is without risks. Strategic ambiguity can lead to misperceptions, both among allies and adversaries. It can create uncertainty about the red lines and commitments, potentially increasing the risk of miscalculation. But for Saudi Arabia, the alternative by choosing a single and rigid alignment may be even more dangerous in a volatile and unpredictable region.
Saudi Arabia is not wavering, rather it is weighing its options carefully. The country’s policy toward Iran reflects a deeper dilemma between the benefits of having a weakened rival and the need for regional stability.
This article is written by Syaripah Shofiah Azzahra, a final-year student at Universitas Al-Azhar Indonesia, majoring in International Relations. She has a strong interest in foreign policy, particularly in Oriental and Middle Eastern studies.
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