The Emerging Strategic Triangle Among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan
- Sanjida Nourin Jhinuk
- 9 minutes ago
- 5 min read
The joint defence agreement signed in Mecca on August 7 between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan is one of the most important developments in the changing security architecture of the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. The agreement was signed by Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
The core principle is that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three. The agreement also includes a framework for military cooperation, intelligence sharing, joint exercises and cooperation in the defence sector. Although the three countries have stated that the agreement is entirely defensive and is not directed against any particular state, its geopolitical implications could extend well beyond the Middle East.
The agreement is a continuation of longstanding relations among the three countries. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have maintained military relations for decades. Members of the Pakistani armed forces have long provided training and assistance to Saudi forces. Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan with financial assistance at various times of economic difficulty. The Saudi-Pakistani Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed in 2025 gave these relations a more formal structure. The latest agreement could further institutionalise their cooperation and potentially expand it into a broader security framework.
According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Saudi Arabia's military expenditure in 2025 was approximately $83.2 billion, while Turkey's was around $30 billion and Pakistan's approximately $11.9 billion. Together, the three countries therefore spent more than $125 billion on defence. Military expenditure alone does not create an effective military alliance, but these figures demonstrate that the three countries possess considerable financial and military resources from which such an arrangement could potentially be developed.
The geographical importance of the three countries is also considerable. Turkey is situated at the intersection of Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Saudi Arabia occupies a central position on the Arabian Peninsula, between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf while also being one of the world's most important energy producers. Pakistan connects South Asia with Central Asia, Iran and the Arabian Sea. Taken together, the three countries could potentially form a strategic arc stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to South Asia encompassing some of the world's most important energy and commercial maritime routes.
The greatest potential advantage of such an alliance would be its ability to strengthen deterrence. If an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all three, the potential cost of aggression could increase significantly. At the same time, cooperation in defence production could reduce dependence on external suppliers. Saudi Arabia's financial resources and its Vision 2030 programme, Turkey's technological capabilities and Pakistan's established defence production capacity could complement one another.
There could also be significant benefits in intelligence cooperation. Terrorism, cyber threats, hybrid warfare, maritime insecurity and regional instability constitute common concerns for all three countries. Effective intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and coordinated planning could strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities and their ability to respond to emerging security threats. At the same time, the agreement should not automatically be interpreted as the creation of a NATO style military alliance.
Although the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) includes 57 member states, it remains primarily a political organisation rather than a collective military-security alliance. The new agreement could therefore represent an attempt by three major Muslim states to create a more functional security framework among themselves. However, transforming a political agreement into an effective collective security structure would not be easy.
The geographical and strategic interests of the three countries are also not identical. Pakistan's principal security concern remains its military rivalry with India. Turkey's security priorities are influenced by developments in Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and its relationship with Russia and NATO. Saudi Arabia has to protect critical energy infrastructure and maritime routes and manage its security environment in the Gulf and the wider Middle East. If Pakistan were to become involved in a military confrontation with India, it is not certain that Turkey and Saudi Arabia would be willing or able to provide direct military assistance. Saudi Arabia has important economic and strategic relationships with India, while Turkey also maintains relations with New Delhi. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to assume that the three countries would automatically fight together in every conflict.
The nuclear dimension makes the situation even more sensitive. Pakistan is a nuclear armed state. Saudi Arabia has substantial strategic ambitions and Turkey is a NATO member. Any arrangement involving Pakistan's nuclear capabilities would inevitably attract international attention.
According to estimates from international research institutions, Pakistan possesses approximately 170 nuclear warheads, while India possesses around 180–190. Any attempt to incorporate nuclear cooperation into the new framework would therefore create major strategic and diplomatic complications.
Turkey's NATO membership presents another complication. Turkey is already part of a collective-defence system through NATO, whose Article 5 provides for collective defence in the event of an armed attack against a member. The emergence of a separate trilateral defence commitment could therefore create questions about how Ankara would reconcile its existing NATO obligations with its new commitments to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Much would depend on the exact scope and interpretation of the new agreement.
Relations with Iran are another major factor. Saudi Arabia and Iran have attempted in recent years to reduce tensions and improve their bilateral relationship. Pakistan also shares a long border with Iran and has an interest in maintaining stable relations with Tehran. If Iran were to perceive the new agreement as a directly anti-Iranian military alliance, it could contribute to increased regional tension and polarisation. For Islamabad in particular, maintaining a stable relationship with Tehran is important because of their shared border and regional interests.
However, the agreement's ultimate significance will depend on whether it develops into a genuine institutional security mechanism or remains primarily a political commitment. Regular ministerial meetings, intelligence sharing arrangements, joint military exercises, defence-industrial cooperation and clearly defined procedures for responding to security crises would be necessary if the arrangement is to develop into an effective security framework.
The agreement may also have consequences beyond the three countries. It could contribute to the emergence of a new security architecture in the broader Muslim world, particularly if other states eventually seek closer association with the framework. At the same time, if it becomes perceived as part of a broader bloc-based competition involving Iran, Israel, India or other regional powers, it could deepen existing divisions rather than contribute to regional stability.
The agreement therefore represents both an opportunity and a challenge. Its long term success will ultimately depend on whether Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan can transform their shared interests into a durable security framework without becoming unnecessarily entangled in one another's conflicts.
This article written by Sanjida Nourin Jhinuk, an Underground Student & Emerging Writer of Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.
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