What America’s Middle East Pivot Means for Southeast Asia
- Flint Fernando Tendy
- 1 day ago
- 5 min read
Ever since the war between the United States and Iran started in February 2026, Washington’s ability to maintain its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific has come under renewed scrutiny. The U.S. has recently shifted significant military assets toward the Middle East to sustain its military campaign against Iran including the redeployment of the USS George Washington from Indo-Pacific to the Middle East to help its counterpart the USS Abraham Lincoln.
The pressure is also visible on the Korean Peninsula where Washington has moved some THAAD missile interceptors from South Korea to the Middle East. The U.S. President Donald Trump even decided to scale back major U.S.–South Korean military exercises due to his reluctance to upset the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Washington insists that these moves do not represent a withdrawal from Asia. Pentagon officials have continued to emphasize that the U.S. remains committed to the Indo-Pacific and has called for Asian allies to contribute more to regional security. The Philippines, for example, has said that the redeployment has not affected its defence cooperation with Washington.
Yet perceptions matter as much as intentions in international politics. For Southeast Asia, the question is no longer simply whether the U.S. is committed to the Indo-Pacific, but whether Washington can remain a reliable strategic partner when crises elsewhere demand its military resources and diplomatic attention as it has already proven that they are not omni-present.
The answer should not be for ASEAN countries to choose between Washington and Beijing. Instead, the Middle East crisis should push Southeast Asia toward greater strategic diversification and stronger regional capacity.
A Crisis Far From Home, With Consequences Close to Home
Though the conflict is taking place thousands of kilometres away from Southeast Asia, the effect has been felt immensely across the region. Southeast Asian countries depend heavily on oil, gas and fertilizer imports from the Middle East. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year therefore created significant economic pressure, contributing to higher energy and food costs across Southeast Asia.
The crisis also demonstrates how vulnerable Southeast Asia is to disruptions at strategic waterways. The Strait of Hormuz may be thousands of kilometres from Southeast Asia, but its disruption has raised questions about the vulnerability of the region’s own maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Malacca, the Luzon Strait and the waters around the Indonesian archipelago.
For ASEAN, therefore, the Middle East is not simply someone else’s conflict. It is a reminder that events beyond the region can quickly affect Southeast Asia’s energy security, economic stability and strategic environment.
The bigger concern: American reliability
The most subsequent issue, however, may be more political rather than economic. The United States has been an important security partner for several Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, among others. During the visit to Manila in July this year, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the U.S. is investing $2.5 billion in security cooperation, re-affirming the importance of Southeast Asia for American security and prosperity. The package includes support for security, energy security, supply chains, and regional infrastructures.
At the same time, Southeast Asian governments have long sought to avoid becoming overly dependent on any single major power. Recent developments reinforce the logic behind that approach. The concern is not necessarily that the United States will permanently leave Southeast Asia. It is that American attention may become increasingly unpredictable. If Washington must simultaneously manage conflicts in the Middle East, competition with China, tensions on the Korean Peninsula and other global challenges, its ability to devote resources to Southeast Asia may become more constrained.
With growing security challenges faced in the region, most notably tensions in the South China Sea, that uncertainty matters because deterrence depends partly on credibility. A partner does not need to withdraw completely for other countries to begin questioning how much support will actually be available during a crisis. A slight decline in American attention could alter calculations among both Southeast Asian countries and external powers instantly.
The challenge is therefore not to replace the United States. It is to make Southeast Asia less prone to changes in American priorities and actions.
ASEAN needs more partners, not a new patron
The appropriate response for Southeast Asian countries should not be reducing cooperation simply because the U.S. is preoccupied elsewhere as it would be counterproductive. Instead, they should continue working with the United States due to the fact that Washington remains an important source of defence cooperation, technology, intelligence and economic engagement while also pursuing greater strategic diversification.
In addition to the U.S., ASEAN should also deepen security and economic partnerships with countries such as Japan, Australia, India, South Korea and the European Union. These relationships do not have to become formal alliances. They can instead provide additional capabilities in maritime security, energy, infrastructure, technology, disaster response and supply-chain resilience.
ASEAN should also strengthen its own capacity as stated in the Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) that took place in Kuala Lumpur in 2025. The region cannot control how Washington allocates its military resources, but it can improve its ability to respond when external powers are distracted. Maritime domain awareness, coast guard cooperation, humanitarian assistance, disaster response and energy security are areas where ASEAN countries can build greater collective resilience without formally turning the organisation into a military alliance.
Finally, ASEAN should make strategic autonomy more than a diplomatic slogan but actually puts it in practice. Strategic autonomy means that ASEAN exercises the freedom to have enough partnerships and domestic capacity to cooperate with major powers without becoming dependent on any one of them. This approach is consistent with the region’s existing preference for multialignment. Recent analysis of U.S. strategy toward Southeast Asia similarly highlights the importance of the region’s efforts to preserve flexibility amid competing external pressures.
Preparing for an uncertain America
The United States may not be abandoning Asia in the near future but Southeast Asia needs to prepare for a world in which American attention is less predictable than it once appeared.
While it does not mean turning away from Washington or moving closer to Beijing by default, it means recognising that ASEAN’s security and prosperity cannot depend on the sustained attention of any single external power.
The Middle East crisis has therefore offered Southeast Asia an uncomfortable but valuable lesson that strategic uncertainty is not something ASEAN can eliminate. It can, however, reduce its exposure to it. The region should continue welcoming American engagement while simultaneously strengthening relationships with other partners and investing in its own regional capabilities.
Ultimately, ASEAN’s objective should not be to find another patron when one becomes distracted. It should be to ensure that no external power is indispensable.
This article written by Flint Fernando Tendy, an International Relations graduate from Universitas Katolik Parahyangan with experience in policy research, analytical writing, and international affairs. He has contributed to research on Indonesia’s Pacific Strategy and written on Southeast Asian politics and global affairs.
Honestly, this is such an impressive piece. The writer analysis is really thoughtful, and love I how you look at the issue from a Southeast Asian perspective rather than just focusing on the U.S. and Iran. The argument flows really well too👏