Brazil’s 2026 Election and the Test of Active Non-Alignment
- Alexandria Virginski
- 1 day ago
- 5 min read
Brazil’s presidential election is being framed as another battle between left and right. But beneath the familiar political divide lies a question with consequences far beyond Brazil’s borders: can Latin America pursue its own interests without being pulled into the orbit of one great power or another?
On October 4, Brazilians will head to the polls to vote for the next President. The race echoes the 2022 presidential elections in which Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva narrowly defeated Jair Bolsonaro. Now, four years later, Lula remains on the ballot, while Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, is carrying his father’s political mantle.
Flávio’s campaign mirrors his father’s, appealing particularly to voters in Brazil’s South and Southeast, as well as evangelical voters, through a platform emphasizing right-wing economic policies, conservative social values, and a tough-on-crime approach. He is backed by Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and President Javier Milei. While President Donald Trump has not officially endorsed Flávio, he has been a strong supporter of Javier Bolsonaro and has accordingly signaled his support for Flávio by hosting him at the Oval Office in May of 2026 and praising him for his character and nationalist pride.
On the other hand, Lula is running for what would be a historic fourth term as president leaning into the success of his prior campaigns targeting northern voters, women voters, and voters in lower socioeconomic classes with plans to reduce inequality and increase household purchasing power through greater “tax justice” policies and an expanded social programming agenda. Lula has generally maintained close working relationships with BRICS countries including, China and India in particular but has also worked closely with other Latin American governments including, Colombia.
As Latin America’s largest economy and one of the Global South’s most influential powers, Brazil’s election will be closely watched around the world. The outcome matters not only to Brazilians, but also to global powers with competing interests in who leads the country and how it positions itself on the world stage. Thus, Brazil’s election is not just a referendum on Lula or Bolsonaro. It is a referendum on whether Latin America can remain strategically autonomous in a world increasingly divided between competing powers.
What is Active Non-Alignment?
Active non-alignment is a foreign policy strategy through which states seek to preserve their autonomy by avoiding firm alignment with any single global power while maintaining relationships with competing powers. Rather than remaining neutral or disengaged from international affairs, states practicing active non-alignment actively engage with different powers according to their own economic, political, and security interests.
In recent years, this strategy has become increasingly relevant as states face growing pressure amid competition among powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. For states in the Global South, active non-alignment can provide a way to pursue trade and investment with one power while maintaining diplomatic, political, or security relationships with another. At its core, active non-alignment is about preserving the freedom to choose: ensuring that a state can cooperate with different powers without becoming dependent on any one of them.
How Active Non-Alignment Has Shaped Brazil’s Foreign Policy
In Brazil, active non-alignment has taken shape through its leadership with BRICS which has arguably provided Brazil with more bargaining power in the international arena. This approach has manifested itself through a more active leadership role in global communications including the G20 and COP30, positioning Brazil as an important diplomatic hub and a regional leader in Latin America.
More importantly, Brazil has demonstrated a willingness to pursue its own national interests without automatically aligning with major competing global powers. This can be seen with its pursuit of the National Development Bank steering away from traditional multilateral institutions created and backed by Western forces and the movement for de-dollarization but also in Brazil’s initial rejection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative proposal back in 2024.
Instead of distancing itself from major powers for lack of alignment, it has worked with both great power competitors on issues that matter most, such as artificial intelligence. In fact, Brazil has welcomed roughly $444 million USD in AI infrastructure split between Chinese companies like Huawei and U.S. companies such as, Nvidia. Rather than being labeled as a close ally of one or the other, Brazil has been able to take advantage of both opportunities which are likely to be most beneficial to long-term development.
Another example, can be seen in Brazil’s approach to the war in Ukraine. Instead of siding with either Russia or Ukraine, Brazil has proposed mediation rejecting sanctions backed by the U.S. while simultaneously recognizing Russia's violation of Ukraine's territorial sovereignty through the United Nations General Assembly vote back in 2022.
Taken together, these examples demonstrate that Brazil's active non-alignment is not simply a policy of neutrality; rather, it is an active effort to diversify partnerships, increase Brazil's bargaining power, and preserve strategic autonomy in an increasingly competitive international system.
The Implications of Brazil’s Upcoming Election
Active non-alignment will be at the forefront of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda for the new presidency, for two reasons. The first relates to regional stability as it pertains to the doctrine itself which is designed for balancing global powers; this becomes much more difficult to achieve when neighboring countries like Argentina under Javier Milei and arguably now Chile as well under José Antonio Kast have actively counter-positioned by pivoting towards U.S. alignment.
Similarly, the second more existential test will be whether active non-alignment is a personal foreign policy preference or an institutional practice. A Lula victory will test whether Brazil can remain committed to active non-alignment in the wake of significant regional shifts toward U.S. alignment.
More importantly, it will reveal whether these pressures force a closer relationship with the U.S., provoke an opposite reaction in the form of deeper alignment with China, or instead strengthen Lula’s steadfast commitment to formalizing active non-alignment as Brazil’s foreign policy agenda.
On the other hand, if Flávio wins, the doctrine's fate will finally answer whether it reflects a durable national consensus or was always contingent on Lula's own presidency, and that answer will ripple well past foreign affairs: it will shape access to Brazil's critical mineral reserves, its credibility as host of COP30, and its standing within BRICS. In other words, how Brazilians vote on domestic grievances—economic performance, polarization, trust in institutions—will simultaneously decide a foreign policy question
Conclusion
Active non-alignment will likely survive Brazil's 2026 election in some form, but survival should not be mistaken for strength. Even a Lula victory would not settle the deeper question hanging over the doctrine: whether it is a lasting national consensus or simply one leader's project. That question will only be answered over time, as active non-alignment either becomes institutionalized enough to survive a change of party, or is revealed to have been dependent on Lula all along. In that sense, the 2026 election is not the final test of active non-alignment it is only the next one.
This article written by Alexandria Virginski, a legal scholar whose research explores the intersections of human rights, international law, and security. She holds a JD from the University of Wisconsin Law School and BA degrees in International Relations and Spanish from Michigan State University.
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