Selective Enforcement and The Credibility of International Law
- Babu George
- 1 day ago
- 4 min read
Selective enforcement by governments that identify themselves as defenders of the rules-based international order may impose substantial costs on that order's credibility. Open challenges from Russia, China and other revisionist powers remain significant, but perceived inconsistency among established powers creates a different problem: states may come to view international law as shaped by strategic alignment rather than applied as a common standard.
This distinction matters because enforcement of international rules depends heavily on state cooperation. Their authority is reinforced when governments accept legal and political costs even when a decision is inconvenient. Written commitments therefore derive much of their legitimacy from patterns of conduct. Recent disputes involving the International Criminal Court (ICC), voting on Ukraine and the growth of alternative institutions illustrate how perceptions of inconsistency can affect that legitimacy.
One court, two political responses
In March 2023, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, alleging responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children. Western governments broadly presented the decision as evidence that even a head of state could be held to account. The legal principle was straightforward: official position should not shield an individual from scrutiny for alleged war crimes.
The political response was less uniform when the accused were close U.S. partners. In November 2024, the ICC issued warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defense minister Yoav Gallant. The chamber said there were reasonable grounds to believe they bore criminal responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including starvation as a method of warfare. The cases differ in their facts and legal questions, and arrest warrants are not convictions. The comparison here concerns institutional consistency: whether the court should be permitted to assess evidence under its statute across politically sensitive cases.
The U.S. response reflected both legal objections and political considerations. The Biden administration opposed congressional sanctions on the court in 2024, while describing the prosecutor's application as a “heedless rush”. In February 2025, President Donald Trump adopted a more coercive approach. An executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC called the warrants “baseless” and the court's actions “illegitimate.”
The United States and Israel are not parties to the Rome Statute, whereas the ICC bases its jurisdiction on alleged conduct in Palestinian territory. That jurisdiction is legally contested. Sanctions against the institution and its staff can also be seen as making cooperation with the court dependent on the identity of those being investigated.
Why many states are hedging
The same credibility gap appears in diplomacy over Ukraine. In March 2022, the UN General Assembly condemned Russia's invasion by 141 votes to five, with 35 abstentions. The result showed broad support for sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also revealed a substantial group unwilling to align fully with the West, including India, China, South Africa and Pakistan.
Those abstentions do not necessarily indicate approval of Russian aggression. They may reflect several considerations, including strategic autonomy, economic ties, regional security priorities and skepticism about Western consistency. The 2003 invasion of Iraq remains an important reference point in that skepticism. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said the war was “not in conformity with the UN Charter” and, from the Charter's perspective, illegal.
Some states outside the Western alliance evaluate appeals to sovereignty in Ukraine alongside earlier departures from the same principle. This does not establish a single motive for their behavior, but it helps explain interest in institutions that reduce dependence on Western-led systems.
Many governments are hedging by diversifying arms suppliers, trade partners and diplomatic relationships. This behavior can serve several purposes, including greater bargaining autonomy and reduced exposure to pressure from any single bloc. BRICS expanded in 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates.
According to a UK House of Commons Library briefing, the group now represents about 45 per cent of the world's population and 35 per cent of global GDP when measured by purchasing-power parity, which adjusts for local price levels. Its members have divergent interests and records, including their own selective approaches to international norms. Even so, they share an interest in reforming global institutions and limiting exposure to unilateral Western sanctions.
The strategic costs of perceived selectivity
Rules acquire authority partly because they can constrain those who helped formulate them. When powerful states demand legal restraint from rivals while resisting scrutiny of partners, smaller states may infer that security depends as much on bargaining power as on law. Their participation in existing institutions can continue alongside investment in alternative arrangements. Over time, that diversification may reduce the influence of institutions established largely under U.S. and European leadership.
This shift can create costs for Western governments even when they retain substantial military and financial advantages. A credible legal order can support cooperation from countries that do not share Western strategy and are wary of Western intentions. It can make compliance less dependent on permanent alignment. If the system is instead perceived as hierarchical, governments may rely more heavily on transactional bargaining. Sanctions may become easier to circumvent, coalition-building more difficult and support from non-aligned states more costly.
Consistency does not mean every conflict is the same. It requires the same evidentiary standards, respect for institutional process and willingness to investigate alleged misconduct regardless of the accused. Governments can challenge an ICC ruling, but they should do so through the court's procedures rather than threats against its judges and staff. They can defend an ally while still insisting on a thorough examination of credible allegations.
Credibility depends on reciprocal constraint
No international order applies its rules with complete consistency, and selective enforcement is not unique to Western states. The institutional consequences may nevertheless be greater when governments that claim a leading role in defending the system resist its constraints. The relevant question is therefore comparative and empirical: whether inconsistent application reduces cooperation, encourages institutional diversification and weakens compliance over time. If the United States and its allies seek broader support for sovereignty, sanctions and international courts, demonstrating that comparable standards apply to partners and rivals would strengthen that case.
This article written by Babu George, PhD, a Professor of International Business at School of Business, Alcorn State University.
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