Broker, Not Architect: Malaysia’s Quiet Pragmatism Meets Its Limits in the Cambodia–Thailand Conflict.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul as they shake hands during the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2025.

By the time ASEAN, along with its leaders, gathered in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025, things were decidedly optimistic. Just in their capacity as the chair of ASEAN, Malaysia had assisted in the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord between Cambodia and Thailand after months of worsening border disputes. The accord, at least in the presence of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, regional leaders and even U.S. President Donald Trump, was billed as a diplomatic breakthrough, an uncommon time when ASEAN crisis management seemed viable.

But then weeks after, the ceasefire failed. Artillery was once again exchanged along the border, sending hundreds of thousands on the run and the two nations into another round of violence. The dramatic twist brought up an embarrassing question: What does this episode tell us about the leadership style of Malaysia in its ASEAN chairmanship and its boundaries?

The response lies in a trend which characterised the tenure of Malaysia in 2025, and that was a conception of noiseless pragmatism. It represents a diplomatic strategy that is not influenced by far-sightedness or active agenda-setting, but by the skilful handling of the relations, elusive facilitation, and readiness to work under the ASEAN structural drawbacks. The Malaysian ease back pragmatism enabled Malaysia to stabilise the situation in times of crisis; however, it also revealed the extent to which just a competent chair can go when the regional security structure is not endowed with any real enforcement provisions.

The Rationality of Tacit Pragmatism

Anwar’s Madani Government has built its foreign policy on the middle-power identity: the country is open to any major power but is affiliated to none, and is concerned with regional stability and avoids confrontational diplomacy. Such an orientation is a logical transformation into the ASEAN strategy of Malaysia in 2025.

This silent pragmatism is typified by three features.

Foremost, Malaysia used multi-track diplomacy. In July 2025, the conflict between the Thai and Cambodians got out of control, displacing about 130,000 people and killing at least several dozen; Kuala Lumpur did not take long in issuing an emergency conference. This led to a subsequent ceasefire in Putrajaya on 28 July under the mediation of the ASEAN, and the presence of U.S and Chinese envoys. Much of this was done in a low key: back-channel communications, special meetings, technical committees, and not dramatic publicultimatums.

Second, Malaysia focused on inclusiveness and non-authoritative dialogue. Instead of sidelining either of the two countries, Cambodia and Thailand, Kuala Lumpur positioned itself as a mediator. It followed its wider policy: it has open lines with Washington and Beijing, promotes centrality of ASEAN without compelling its member states to make a decision.

Third, Malaysia operated under ASEAN, which was a consensus-driven structure. It was not like bigger regional players trying to reinvent the agenda of the bloc or demanding some fundamental reforms. Rather, Malaysia was to have the mechanisms in place work better and in this case, that measure was a pragmatic goal but a limited one.

In this way, quiet pragmatism is also a characteristic of the ASEAN institutional reality, as well as part of the diplomatic temper of Malaysian. It is the style that is geared towards management and not the transformation of tensions.

A Turning Point and a High-Point

This model was best tested by the Cambodia-Thailandconflict.

Following fatal fights in the middle of 2025, Malaysia was at the forefront of the diplomatic reaction. It held crisis meetings, sent envoys and took advantage of its contacts with each party. These attempts resulted in the July ceasefire, and later the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord in October; a treaty that was touted as evidence that, despite all the critics branding the ASEAN to be stagnant and ineffective, the group was capable of working together as long as there was an effective chair to guide them.

However, the breakdown of the accord within weeks showed the underlying structural issue that Malaysia would be able to broker a deal, but would not be able to enforce or sustain it. ASEAN does not have any means of monitoring, peacekeeping or any punitive measures. It is based on voluntary compliance, and when the political incentives changed in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, the understanding began to collapse, and nothing much could be captured by ASEAN.

The collapse of the peace accord in this respect was not the failure of Malaysia. It was an act of the constraints of silent pragmatism, which is working in an under-institutionalised security system. Malaysia managed to avoid the most dreadful scenario, the uncontrollable rise, but failed to transform the short-term diplomacy into long-term stability. Quiet pragmatism operates well during crises, but it cannot perform well in situations that involve binding obligations or structural solutions to conflicts.

The Chairmanship vs. The Legacy of Malaysia.

What is the effect of the Malaysian diplomacy legacy in the year 2025?

To start with, Malaysia enhanced its credibility as a middle-power convener. Its capability of taking the competing states to the table, organising the involvement of the major powers at the ASEAN Summit, and preventing the crisis of the region from running out of control all require real diplomatic capital.

Second, procedural leadership was proven in Malaysia. This helped ASEAN react faster than it would otherwise in times of crisis, even without the bold initiatives, since it enhanced communication channels, created trust, and made the organisation more responsive to crisis response.

But the third, the limits of ASEAN’s structural weakness were exposed by Malaysia’s experience. The relapse in Cambodiaand Thailand indicated that no matter how competently the diplomacy is performed, it cannot replace the institutional capacity without monitoring mechanisms as well as commitments that cannot be enforced on each other.

Malaysia was a broker, not an architect. It became rather good at dealing with crises, but was unable to redefine the regional security order that results in the recurrence of the same crisis.

What Comes Next?

Increased pragmatism of Malaysia will probably be the hallmark of its foreign policy. It fits the middle-power identity of the country, corresponds to the pattern of diplomacy in ASEAN, and provides a practical approach in a geopolitical fragment of the region.

However, the scenarios of 2025 pose a strategic question to both:

Do we have enough quiet leadership in a time of forward-looking scuttling of regional insecurity?

Should future chairs desire to prevent similar collapses in the future, as the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord, ASEAN might be forced to consider new instruments like joint border surveillance, crisis-response teams or more powerful mediating tools into which they can invest the reality of diplomacy in the future.

The chairman of Malaysia in ASEAN 2025 demonstrates what silent pragmatism can do. But it also shows what even the most competent chair is unable to do without institutional reform that goes beyond that.

---

This article, written by Gareth Liu Zi Yuan, a senior research associate from Universiti Malaya. His research expertise focuses on Malaysia studies, Malaysia-Sino relations, and ASEAN affairs.