Growing Concerns Regarding India’s Nuclear Stockpile
- Zamzam Channa
- 1 day ago
- 5 min read
In recent years, alarming growth has been seen in India’s nuclear arsenal, facilitated and supported by its Western partners with wilful oversight. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), India possessed 190 nuclear warheads as of January 2026, up from 180 the previous year. The SIPRI Yearbook 2026 has further authenticated these number. In addition, the SIPRI report has revealed that India had zero deployed nuclear warheads in 2025 and 12 deployed in early 2026. It is an ominous development for regional and international strategic stability, peace and security.
India has also been modernising its nuclear delivery systems, including canisterised missiles and platforms capable of carrying Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). India has also been expanding its sea-based deterrent with the addition of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) such as INS Aridhaman, signalling qualitative growth in capability alongside quantitative expansion. According to a 2025 report of FAS, India’s nuclear stockpile had increased by 20 percent over the past five years. It reflects a steady upward trajectory that carries consequences not only for South Asia but also for the already fragile global arms control architecture.
For decades, the international community has relied on non-proliferation mechanisms, especially on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to restrict the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. However, India remains outside the NPT framework, has the fastest-growing nuclear weapons program in South Asia and is involved in the proliferation of lethal dual-capable BrahMos missiles developed in collaboration with Russia.
Incessant growth of India’s nuclear stockpile has been boosted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver granted to it in 2008. Consequently, India is free to import nuclear fuel and technologies for its civil program from any country, enabling New Delhi to use its domestic nuclear materials for nuclear weapons program, posing a threat to regional and international strategic stability.
India’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) notably excluded 8 nuclear reactors from the scope of the agreement, besides the two Fast Breeder Reactors. Reportedly, while granting a waiver to India, commercial considerations had influenced a number of important NSG members, who sidestepped proliferation concerns of the organisation, which was established in response to India’s first nuclear test in 1974. The selective application of NSG rules in favour of India for political and commercial reasons has eroded the non-proliferation regime and impacted NSG’s credibility.
While India continues to describe its nuclear posture as based on Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), backed by a declared No-First-Use (NFU) policy, developments over the past decade suggest a gradual shift in its nuclear posture. Noticeable increase in India’s fissile material stockpile, advancements in dual-capable delivery systems, and the operationalisation of nuclear triad indicate ambitions that threaten regional and international peace and security.
According to the 2024 assessment by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), India possessed an estimated 700 kg of weapons-grade Plutonium and approximately 5.3 tons of weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Data from the Reaching Critical Will indicate that India’s 8 unsafeguarded nuclear reactors have the capacity to produce up to 200 kg of weapons-grade Plutonium per year.
The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) has estimated that 4 kg of Plutonium is enough to produce one nuclear weapon. Considering this, in 2024, India had the ability to add approximately 50 Plutonium-based nuclear warheads annually to its existing nuclear stockpile, making it one of the fastest-growing nuclear-weapon programs in the world.
Coinciding with India’s fast-growing fissile material production is its advancing missile program. India’s land-based nuclear missile capability has expanded in range and sophistication. The Agni-V Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which is capable of ranges exceeding 5,000 kilometres, with some assessments suggesting up to 8,000 km, places vast geographic areas from Europe, Africa, and the Far East within its strike range.
According to a report published by Al Jazeera in August 2025, reinforced by the recent statement of Chairman of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), India is poised to test Agni-VI ICBM, which is expected to have a range of 12,000 km and MIRV capability. These developments are creating strategic uncertainties not just at the regional but also at the global level.
India’s sea-based nuclear capabilities have also evolved with the induction of Arihant-class SSBNs, armed with K-series Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). The K-4 and K-5, with reported ranges of around 3,500 km and 5,000 to 6,000 km, respectively, and the projected K-6 with a planned range of 8,000 km, represent India’s expanding sea-based coercive nuclear posture.
India’s expanding nuclear arsenal prevents it from supporting international non-proliferation efforts. On 31 October 2025, India was among the 4 states to abstain on the UN resolution titled A/C.1/80/L.43 on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The resolution reaffirmed the urgency of bringing the CTBT into force and strengthening the global norms against nuclear testing.
India’s abstention raises questions about its intentions and commitment to responsible nuclear stewardship. While advancing its nuclear weapons program, New Delhi continues to avoid binding test prohibitions. India’s approach weakens the credibility of its normative claims and reflects a persistent reluctance to accept constraints that are essential for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
In recent years, Western policy circles have attempted to construct a misplaced threat perception regarding Pakistan’s hypothetical ICBM capability. During the hearing of the US Senate Intelligence Committee on 18 March 2026, former Director of the US National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard made an unsubstantiated claim regarding threat posed to the US Homeland by Pakistan’s non-existent ICBM program. India which actually possesses ICBMs and SLBMs capable of targeting the US was not mentioned. As a matter of fact, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is India-specific and the maximum range of its delivery systems is 2,750 km, designed to cover the entirety of India, including its islands in the Bay of Bengal.
In contrast, India has been actively developing long-range delivery systems with ranges of up to 16,000 km. These capabilities, coupled with MIRV technology, ongoing advancements in hypersonic systems and rapid development of the SSBN fleet with SLBM of 3,500-8,000 km, provide India with a latent capacity to project nuclear force well beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
The amplification of a non-existent threat posed by Pakistan, while overlooking tangible developments in India’s long-range strike capabilities with potential to bring Europe and mainland US within striking range of its nuclear missiles, reflects troubling inconsistencies, double standards, biased threat assessment, discrimination and exceptionalism for geopolitical considerations.
The expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal and long-range dual-capable delivery systems has serious implications for the stability of deterrence beyond the region and international peace and security. The rapid growth in India’s warhead inventory, combined with advancements in missile technology, reflects an evolving posture geared towards enhancing strategic reach to become a global military power. Such developments blur the distinction between deterrence and offensive power projection.
India’s nuclear build-up contributes to vertical proliferation. In a nuclearised region marked by recurring crises due to repeated military aggression by nuclear-armed India against nuclear-armed Pakistan and unresolved disputes with Kashmir as nuclear flashpoint, such unbridled expansion of nuclear and missile arsenal heightens instability and increases the risk of strategic miscalculations.
India’s irresponsible nuclear behaviour, evidenced by military attacks on nuclear-armed Pakistan in February 2019 and May 2025, should serve as a reminder to NSG member states of the grave mistake they made in granting waiver to India in 2008. None of them would remain safe once India’s nuclear arsenal grows further and its delivery systems are able to hit every capital of the world.
This article written by Zamzam Channa, Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS). She holds a BS in International Relations (Silver Medal) from the University of Sindh, Jamshoro. Her areas of research interest are arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and emerging military technologies.
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