Indonesia’s Bridge-Building Ambition: Global Aspirations Rest on Regional

Indonesia’s president’s intention in the Gaza issue and its role as an intermediary in the future peace efforts in the region post-Gaza summit marks an important step in projecting Indonesia's role as a global bridge builder. However, this ambition risks being undermined, and its further role could be hindered by the existing cases Indonesia faces in handling regional crises closer to home. The ongoing crises in Myanmar and the escalating Thailand–Cambodia tensions have challenged ASEAN diplomacy and Indonesia’s ability to co-lead within it. While a parallel approach to handling both issues is possible, diverted attention without a proper strategy and the potential of a backward scenario crisis in Southeast Asia, poses greater losses for Indonesia as a regional peacemaker and its broader prospects.

Two major crises that are still ongoing include the Thailand–Cambodia conflict and the Myanmar conflict, which has now reached its fourth year. It is important to note that Indonesia took the first initiative during the initial year of the Myanmar conflict. However, the Myanmar junta is proceeding with an election process despite the absence of a cessation of violence, which goes against the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), an agreement that Indonesia helped initiate as well. Indonesia can only position itself as a future partner in the Gaza peace transition team if it continues to prove its role in maintaining peace transition processes with its neighbors.

Indonesia has more experience in maintaining communication with related actors in the Myanmar conflict than in Gaza, whether with the junta, the National Unity Government (NUG), or ethnic group representatives, thanks to its “tent approach” during its 2023 chairmanship, which engaged all partners in building a common discussion platform. Considering Indonesia's position that seeks to utilize ASEAN mechanisms instead of building its own, this does not mean Indonesia cannot take an active role in the dynamic.

Utilizing the extended informal consultation mechanism established to streamline ASEAN member initiatives on Myanmar, Indonesia had an earlier direct role with parties involved to position ASEAN to orchestrate possible engagement structure with Myanmar to compensate for ASEAN decision not to send observers due to the dilemma of legitimation or isolating the Junta. Indonesia thus holds an important role in protecting ASEAN from legitimacy traps in Myanmar through a selective engagement approach.

Indonesia should advise ASEAN in considering utilizing a hybrid informal track that works with both governmental and non-governmental agencies in establishing bridges, especially for backdoor engagement in dialogues, technical missions, and humanitarian coordination, under the context of the pre-election and post-election phases in Myanmar. A technical advisory platform using a neutral informal track mechanism is needed. This platform should be able to collect and monitor election developments while allowing agencies, humanitarian organizations, local governance bodies, and ethnic actors to track restrictions on humanitarian routes, new displacements, or shutdowns that affect civilian access to basic services and aid.

In parallel, such data collection would ensure ASEAN’s readiness for post-election engagement by providing evidence-based input for security, recovery, and humanitarian strategies. The technical nature of this platform would strategically position the humanitarian lens to protect the mutual interests of all parties. While tricky, Indonesia is in position to push for humanitarian-led ASEAN brokering initiatives, taking into consideration Indonesia’s previous role in facilitating cooperation of humanitarian access that was not possible before with related parties including Myanmar Junta in prior chairmanship. With this in mind, Indonesia bears significant responsibility to contribute to ASEAN’s leadership in positioning appropriate engagement strategies for the Myanmar election alongside the current chair.

The case of the Thailand–Cambodia crisis serves as an amplifier to the broader crisis in Southeast Asia. It is important to note that mediation by Malaysia, as ASEAN chairman, was able to bring an initial cessation of violence. However, it has become clear that the crisis requires long-term monitoring, as clashes remain likely, with around 300,000 people temporarily displaced along the border. Initial ASEAN efforts have produced some progress, including the U.S. administration’s encouragement for both parties to welcome ASEAN initiatives under Malaysia’s leadership, and the follow-up between Thailand and Cambodia on ASEAN-brokered arrangements.

However, the movement by the U.S. president to directly apply economic pressure to persuade Thailand and Cambodia into peace talks serves as a concern, as ASEAN does not operate through coercion in principle, particularly so when it comes from external parties. While it has been framed as a successful attempt, such an approach may harm ASEAN’s credibility in leading its own peace processes without the use of external coercive measures. The ASEAN special meeting on global trade uncertainties, held in April 2025 and convened by Malaysia, was aimed to collectively reinforce ASEAN’s commitment to intra-trade cooperation to cushion external trade shocks. However, no discussion has yet addressed the use of direct external economic pressure on ASEAN’s political affairs.

Indonesia should re-engage with the ASEAN chair to consider reconvening a special meeting, if necessary, to establish a proper consultation mechanism vis-à-vis ASEAN partners. This mechanism should be able to monitor and assess collective mitigation efforts against coercive economic measures used in intra-ASEAN political contexts. Taking this as a case study for future ASEAN-led initiatives, a similar model to the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) could be studied and adapted to fit ASEAN’s non-retaliatory approach.

It is important for ASEAN to be the first responder and strategic channel for partners engaging in intra-ASEAN matters without resorting to coercion even through trade. Which could dilute ASEAN role in compensation of direct bilateral role in peace brokering initiatives. As illustrated by Thailand’s comment expressing a preference for handling matters bilaterally while remaining open to regional mediation. This serves as a reminder for ASEAN members including Indonesia to fill in the blanks.

Indonesia, along with ASEAN, should continue to strengthen the role of regional mediation in providing a platform of continuity where bilateral talks may not be able to contribute, taking into consideration the influence of domestic internal affairs that may halt progress, and serving as a mechanism to counterbalance fragmentation that external countries may seek to influence and exploit within ASEAN affairs, which would otherwise undermine ASEAN unity and credibility in managing peace processes.

Taking into focus these two existing crises, Indonesia should proactively engage through available ASEAN platforms and clarify what it means by “supporting the ASEAN chair.” Without a clear blueprint, this phrase risks being seen as symbolic delegation rather than active cooperation, a potentially harmful signal for Indonesia’s leadership in crisis management. This observation is not unrealistic, Indonesia had in the past posture a strategic position with ASEAN affairs while working with the ASEAN chair rather than being the chairman itself. President Joko Widodo had been the first initiator that requested for a special meeting on Myanmar with Brunei as the chairman of the time, during the initial conflict in Myanmar. An example of Indonesia’s active co-leadership in ASEAN affairs.

It is therefore imperative for Indonesia to increase its priority on regional engagement alongside ASEAN. Considering President Prabowo’s intention to deploy peacekeeping efforts in Gaza, Indonesia should explore a similar strategic blueprint for long-term initiatives in collaboration with ASEAN for both the Thailand–Cambodia and Myanmar crises. We should note that Gaza’s peace coordination efforts are handled by its neighboring countries separately yet remain collective in goal, even amid differing bloc interests. Indonesia can further highlight that regional mechanisms, such as those used in the Gaza process, are inseparable from the continuity of peace efforts, whether in the Middle East or in Southeast Asia.

---

This article is written by M. Kenzo Baskoro, a Country Representative for a Japanese public company in Indonesia with experience in corporate strategy and sustainable development in Southeast Asia.