Reimagining Asia’s Position in the World of Disorder

The global order is in disarray. Great power competition is intensifying, multilateral institutions are weakening, and long-standing alliances are under strain. Conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, economic fragmentation, climate shocks, and the erosion of global norms have deepened a sense of instability. The war in Ukraine has redrawn geopolitical fault lines, while violence in Gaza and regional tensions in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf threaten global trade flows. At the same time, global governance mechanisms—from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization—are struggling to respond effectively. In this shifting landscape, Asia is being forced to rethink its place in the world—and its foreign policy strategies.

As both the United States (U.S.) and China advance competing visions of global leadership, countries across Asia are navigating heightened uncertainty. While an increasingly transactional U.S. pulls back from certain international commitments, China is becoming more assertive across diplomatic, economic, and security fronts. From trade tensions and technology restrictions to strategic pressure points, recent Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues in Asia have underscored a common message: the region is recalibrating.

Against this backdrop, countries across Asia are no longer willing to passively align with one power. Instead, they are adopting a more pragmatic approach: recalibrating their foreign policies, diversifying strategic partnerships, and strengthening their capacity to act independently. These moves are not only driven by their traditional foreign policy doctrines but also pushed by internal and external pressures.

This emerging trend was clearly visible in two recent forums: the Nikkei Forum: The Future of Asia in Tokyo, Japan, and the Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. There are several takeaways that are worth further debates.

Despite the diverse interests represented, a shared set of concerns and aspirations emerged. Policymakers, academics, and business leaders repeatedly underscored the need for Asian countries to reduce their strategic dependence on external powers. This includes not only reassessing security ties but also rethinking economic and technological dependencies. The region is increasingly wary of becoming collateral damage in major power rivalries, particularly as the U.S.-China trade and technology wars escalate.

There are many arguments revolving around the losing strategic presence of the U.S. and declining trust toward the American commitments to the region. A few Asian experts are also reviewing how big the percentage of the US economic cooperation is compared to other partners. Measuring strategic dependence has started to become more quantifiable than before.

In practice, this recalibration has taken different forms. Some countries are deepening ties with new partners as part of broader hedging strategies. For instance, Vietnam, Indonesia, and India have all sought to expand cooperation with the European Union, Australia, and Japan. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy reflects a conscious effort to maintain balanced relations with China, Russia, the U.S., and the European Union (E.U.). Furthermore, among Southeast Asian countries, there is also growing interest in groups like BRICS and OECD, not as alternatives to existing ‘alliances’ but as part of a broader portfolio of (geo)strategic options.

Economic diversification is indeed a central pillar of this shift. The “China Plus One” strategy—where states and firms reduce overreliance on China by expanding supply chains elsewhere in Asia—is gaining traction. Countries such as India, Malaysia, and Indonesia are positioning themselves as attractive alternatives for global investment. This is substantially important to countries where industrialization remains expected to be the driver for greater growth.

While China remains a central economic partner for much of the region, particularly for trade and investment, the desire to “de-risk” rather than decouple reflects a nuanced understanding of both opportunity and vulnerability. By developing more balanced economic relationships, countries in Asia hope to insulate themselves from geopolitical and geoeconomic shocks and other disruptions while also preserving access to global markets.

On another note, participating in more regional or cross-regional trade agreements is also present as a visible move by Asian countries. China, South Korea, and Indonesia are among those who have applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with a strategic intent to enlarge the volume and scope of their trade exports. Moreover, Malaysia has just launched negotiations for a free trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Meanwhile, Indonesia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) recently concluded substantive negotiations for the Indonesia–EAEU Free Trade Agreement (I–EAEU FTA).

One solid conclusion from these trends is that Asian countries remain fully committed to rules-based trading systems and free trade, despite the growing waves of protectionism and economic nationalism. Notably, Asian leaders are more actively seen advocating for WTO reform and the expansion of trade agreements. This is in sharp contrast to most Western countries, which are now pivoting to being economically more isolationist in the form of unilateral trade decisions.

Interestingly, Asian countries are also increasing confidence considerably in themselves and their neighbors as well as in their significant regional potential. In Southeast Asia, countries have been very optimistic to enhance their intra-regional trade and investment, incentivized by the increasingly connected ASEAN, both physically and digitally. In East Asia, also, the three major countries—China, Japan, and South Korea—have sought to improve their economic cooperation as the middle ground to push for more regional economic resilience.

Yet this pursuit of strategic autonomy through various forms is not without challenges. Trust deficits and rivalries between Asian countries, existing conflicts and wars in Asia, disparities in governance and development, not to mention the persistence of internal political and institutional constraints, continue to complicate regional coordination. The ability and commitment to provide a more stable and peaceful Asia should always be the top priority.

In some cases, efforts to strengthen multilateral mechanisms, such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, remain uneven and sometimes undermined by external interference or divergent national interests. Moreover, external pressures—from rising global interest rates to accelerating climate risks—could further test regional resilience in the years ahead.

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This article by Noto Suoneto and Genevieve Donnellon-May first appeared in Moden Diplomacy on 16 August 2025. It is featured here as part of our Member Publications archive.