Xi’s Southeast Asia Tour: China Needs More Than a Charm Offensive

As Chinese President Xi Jinping wrapped up his April tours of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, Beijing’s message to Southeast Asia was unambiguous: China offers stability and partnership in contrast to American “unilateral bullying,” “hegemonism,” and “protectionism.” The timing of the visit could hardly be more opportune. Like the rest of the world, Southeast Asia has been reeling from Trump’s “Liberation Day” reciprocal tariffs. His proposed levies—as high as 49 per cent—have rattled the region’s trade-dependent economies. Against this backdrop, Beijing’s overtures found receptive ears in the region. Xi’s visit produced a flurry of bilateral agreements—45 with Vietnam, 31 with Malaysia, and 37 with Cambodia—covering trade, supply chains, infrastructure, digital technology, agriculture, green growth, and artificial intelligence.

Yet charm alone will not be enough. If Beijing hopes to turn strategic opportunity into durable regional influence, it should address the deeper anxieties of its smaller neighbours. The State of Southeast Asia Survey (SSEA 2025) reveals that while China’s soft power has grown in recent years, it trailed the US as the region’s preferred great power in the course of the Survey’s run from 2020 to 2025 (except for 2024). More than half of respondents (56.4 per cent) acknowledge China’s economic clout, yet nearly two-thirds (61.9 per cent) express unease about such influence. An even larger share —68.8 per cent— are apprehensive about Beijing’s expanding political and strategic footprint.

If China is serious about capitalising on America’s tariff-driven alienation, it must do more than sign deals. It should address three long-standing concerns of ASEAN countries: industrial overcapacity, asymmetric trade, and maritime and Mekong security.

First, Southeast Asian economies are increasingly concerned about China’s industrial overcapacity. With its domestic economy cooling and Western markets erecting more barriers, Beijing has sought to offload excess production elsewhere — much of it to countries in ASEAN, its top trading partner. While China’s exports to ASEAN countries have traditionally comprised intermediate goods feeding Southeast Asia’s own manufacturing bases, a growing proportion now consists of cheap finished products or goods which compete directly with local manufacturers.

The steel industry is a case in point. In 2023, China’s steel exports hit their highest levels since 2016, with nearly 30 per cent destined for ASEAN countries. This influx of cheap Chinese steel has compelled Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam to adopt or consider anti-dumping and other safeguard measures to protect their domestic industries. Similar pressures are emerging in petrochemicals, electronics, and high-tech sectors where Southeast Asia hopes to climb up the value chain. Unless China signals a clear commitment to avoid dumping surplus goods into regional markets, it risks choking off ASEAN countries’ industrial ambitions.

Second, to position itself credibly as an economic alternative to the US, China should address growing trade imbalances with ASEAN countries. SSEA 2025 found that 18.2 per cent of respondents believe bilateral ties would improve if trade were made “truly mutually beneficial.” ASEAN’s trade with China has surged but there are imbalances. Since 2010, ASEAN’s trade deficit with China has ballooned from US$10 billion to a whopping US$190 billion in 2024. To narrow the gap, Beijing must import more than raw commodities and tropical fruit. It should open its market to higher-value ASEAN goods — from machinery and electronics to processed foods and green technologies. China’s own transition toward a consumption-driven economy could, in theory, support this shift. However, this is far from guaranteed. If it cannot, talk of “win-win cooperation” will ring hollow.

Third, Beijing should address entrenched security concerns over its assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Mekong River. When asked what could worsen their impression of China, 28.8 per cent of SSEA 2025 respondents cited “strong-arm tactics” in these contested spaces. That number jumped to 54.4 per cent in Vietnam, 46.2 per cent in the Philippines, and 29.5 per cent in Brunei — all of them being South China Sea claimants. Maritime tensions remain the top geopolitical concern across the region, and was cited by 51.6 per cent of respondents. Meanwhile, 30 per cent think China could improve relations most by resolving disputes peacefully and in line with international law — a view strongly held in the Philippines (72.1 per cent), Vietnam (60.6 per cent), Malaysia (50.0 per cent), and Indonesia (50 per cent).

China’s behaviour along the Mekong River also continues to raise alarms. Civil society and scientists have long flagged the risks that China’s construction and operation of Mekong hydropower dams pose to downstream communities. The China-funded Funan Techo Canal in Cambodia, to which Xi reaffirmed his support during his Phnom Penh visit, has led to concerns in Hanoi. The project threatens to alter sediment flows in the Mekong Delta and disrupt Vietnam’s food security — an existential issue for the country.

Without meaningful shifts in China’s approach, no number of memoranda or infrastructure pledges will resolve the trust deficit. If Beijing truly hopes to replace the US as Southeast Asia’s security partner of choice, it must go beyond vague assurances of peace and stability. What is needed is a demonstrable, sustained commitment to its neighbours’ sovereignty, resilience, and economic ambitions.

To be clear, the region is not seeking a new hegemon. China’s opportunity stems not from newfound affections, but from America’s retreat from global leadership. If Beijing can address concerns over overcapacity, trade imbalances, and strategic assertiveness, it may yet be seen as a credible and responsible actor. Xi’s charm offensive has opened doors — whether they remain open will depend on what follows.

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This article by Phan Xuan Dung and Nguyen Khac Giang first appeared in Fulcrum on 23 April 2025. It is featured here as part of our Member Publications archive.